Is Military Law Relevant to the  Evolving Standards of Decency  Embodied in the Eighth Amendment? by Yung, Corey Rayburn
Copyright  2008  by  Northwestern  University  School  of  Law Vol.  103 





IS MILITARY LAW RELEVANT TO THE ―EVOLVING 
STANDARDS OF DECENCY‖ EMBODIED IN THE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT? 
Corey Rayburn Yung 
On June 25, 2008, the United States Supreme Court issued an opinion 
in Kennedy v. Louisiana holding that the application of the death penalty to 
the crime of aggravated child rape violated the Eighth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution.1  The Court reached a contentious five-to-four 
decision with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority.  Applying the 
―evolving standards of decency‖ approach to determine whether the pu-
nishment at issue was ―cruel and unusual,‖ the Court examined the laws of 
the states and federal government.  In so doing, the Court wrote that, ―Con-
gress in the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 expanded the number of 
federal crimes for which the death penalty is a permissible sentence, includ-
ing certain nonhomicide offenses; but it did not do the same for child rape 
or abuse.‖2 
Just three days after the opinion was issued, Colonel Dwight Sullivan 
noted on the CAAFlog blog that the Court‘s statement concerning federal 
law did not tell the whole story.3  In fact, amendments made by Congress in 
2006 to the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) explicitly allow for 
the death penalty in child rape cases.4  Colonel Sullivan‘s post about the 
omission in the Court‘s opinion might have been relegated to the dustbin of 
Internet history had the leading Supreme Court reporter not taken notice. 
On July 2, Linda Greenhouse wrote an article in the New York Times 




  Assistant Professor of Law at John Marshall Law School and author of the Sex Crimes Blog, 
http://sexcrimes.typepad.com (link).  I would like to thank Amy Keller, Andrew Peterson, Bidish Sarma, 
David Schwartz, the commenters at CAAFlog and Volokh Conspiracy, and the editors at the Northwes-
tern University Law Review Colloquy for their help with this Essay. 
1
  128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008) (link). 
2
  Id. at 2652.  The dissent characterized the majority‘s finding more starkly: ―Congress has not 
enacted a law permitting the death penalty for the rape of a child . . . .‖  Id. at 2672 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
3
  Posting of Colonel Dwight Sullivan to CAAFlog, http://caaflog.blogspot.com/2008/06/supremes-
dis-military-justice-system.html (Jun. 28, 2008, 18:25 EST) (link). 
4
  See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-163, 119 STAT. 
3136, 3263.  There was also a subsequent executive order putting the amendment into force.  Exec. Or-
der No. 13,447 § 3(d), 3 C.F.R. § 278 (2008). 
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post.5  Greenhouse noted that it was not just Justice Kennedy‘s majority 
opinion that had overlooked the UCMJ amendment.  There was no mention 
of the UCMJ in the party briefs, amicus curiae briefs, or Justice Alito‘s dis-
senting opinion. 
Greenhouse‘s short column set off a firestorm of media criticism at-
tacking the Court‘s opinion in Kennedy.6  While the criticism initially 
erupted from traditionally conservative media outlets, calls for rehearing 
were soon made by those across the political spectrum7 and throughout the 
legal blogosphere.8  Louisiana filed a petition for rehearing based largely 
upon the Court‘s failure to address the UCMJ amendment.9  Although ab-
sent from the initial briefing in the case, the Solicitor General‘s office also 
filed a motion in support of rehearing based upon the Court‘s omission.10  
While rehearing motions have very rarely been granted, on September 8 the 
Court took the unusual step of requesting further briefing on whether the 
case should be reargued or the original opinion should be amended.11  That 
move by the Court potentially indicates that it is seriously considering re-
hearing the Kennedy case. 
While many of the critics and the Louisiana brief used the omission of 
the military code revision as a vehicle to attack the greater substance of the 
Court‘s opinion, there emerged a legal issue that clearly required attention: 
was military law relevant to the Court‘s reasoning in such cases?  Based 
upon an exhaustive review of prior Supreme Court cases and the role of the 
military in American society, the answer is clearly ―no.‖  Consequently, it 






  Linda Greenhouse, In Court Ruling on Executions, a Factual Flaw, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 2, 2008, at 
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/02/washington/02scotus.html (link). 
6




  See, e.g., Laurence Tribe, The Supreme Court is Wrong on the Death Penalty, WALL ST. J., Jul. 
31, 2008, at A13, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121746018426398797.html? 
mod=opinion_main_commentaries (link). 
8
  See, e.g., Posting of Douglas Berman to Sentencing Law and Policy, 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2008/07/add-prof-tribe.html (Jul. 31, 2008, 
1:43 PM) (link). 
9
  Petition for Rehearing, Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (S. Ct. July 21, 2008) [hereinafter Peti-
tion for Rehearing], available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/rehear-
kennedy-v-la-7-21-08.pdf (link). 
10
  Motion for Leave to File Brief and Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Peti-
tion for Rehearing, Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. July 2008) [hereinafter Solicitor General‘s 
Brief], available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/07/kennedy_07-
343amicusrehearing1.pdf (link). 
11
  Kennedy v. Louisiana, 07-343, 2008 WL 4125974 (U.S. Sept. 8, 2008) (mem.) (order in pending 
case), available at http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2008/09/kennedy-07-343-on-9-8-
08.pdf (link). 
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I. EVOLVING STANDARDS OF DECENCY 
The Eighth Amendment, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment,12 prohibits ―cruel and unusual punishments.‖13  In 1958, in 
Trop v. Dulles,14 the Supreme Court altered the course of Eighth Amend-
ment jurisprudence when it held that punishment must comport with, ―the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing socie-
ty.‖15  For better or worse, the examination of the evolving standards of de-
cency continues to be the Court‘s methodology for evaluating statutes 
challenged under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.  To determine 
what constitutes ―cruel and unusual‖ punishment under that approach, the 
Court looks at objective indicia to determine the national consensus regard-
ing the application of the punishment at issue.16 
In Kennedy, the Court found that the objective indicia showed a na-
tional consensus against the death penalty for child rape.17  The objective 
indicia included both the laws of sovereign governments in the United 
States and the decisions of juries to apply the death penalty in particular 
cases.  The Court noted that forty-four states and the federal government 
did not allow for capital punishment in cases of child rape.  There was no 
dispute as to the law of the forty-four states and the federal government 
generally.  However, the Supreme Court‘s omission of the new UCMJ poli-
cy led the Solicitor General to support Louisiana‘s petition for rehearing 
because ―there is (to say the least) a strong presumption that the recent de-
termination by Congress and the President that capital punishment is an ap-
propriate sanction for child rape accurately reflects the views of our 
society.‖18  The persuasiveness of this claim can be evaluated by examining 






  See Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 664–67 (1962) (link). 
13
  U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
14
  356 U.S. 86 (1958) (link). 
15
  Id. at 101. 
16
  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (―In these cases the Court has been 
guided by ‗objective indicia of society‘s standards as expressed in legislative enactments and state prac-
tice with respect to executions.‘‖) (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 563 (2005)) (link). 
17
  See id. at 2653. 
18
  Solicitor General‘s Brief, supra note 10, at 8. While it is beyond the scope of the arguments spe-
cifically developed in this Essay, there is substantial reason to question Louisiana‘s characterization of 
the UCMJ amendment as a ―recent determination‖ that child rape should be punished by death.  In fact, 
prior to the 2006 amendment, under the UCMJ, rape of any person (child or adult) was punishable by 
death.  See 10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2006) (those convicted of rape ―shall be punished by death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct‖).  The amendment did not actually make any new criminal 
conduct death eligible. 
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II. PRIOR OPINIONS CONCERNING THE EVOLVING STANDARDS 
To determine Court practice regarding the inclusion of the UCMJ in 
Eighth Amendment cases requires a thorough examination of prior Court 
opinions.  Louisiana and the Solicitor General were only able to marshal the 
most meager evidence in support of their contention that an amendment to 
the UCMJ has been relevant in determining the national consensus.  Louisi-
ana‘s petition for rehearing offered two precedents where the Court may 
have considered military law in evaluating a claim under the Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment Clause.19  The Solicitor General‘s brief did not cite even a 
single opinion in which the Court considered military law in its Eighth 
Amendment analysis.  Neither of the prior opinions cited concerned the use 
of military law in evaluating the national consensus as to the emerging 
standards of decency embodied in the Eighth Amendment. 
The first opinion cited by Louisiana was the 1879 case of Wilkerson v. 
Utah.20  However, Wilkerson predated the advent of the Court‘s current 
evolving standards of decency methodology and the enactment of the 
UCMJ by over seventy years.  The Wilkerson Court did not cite military 
practice to gauge a national consensus.  In Wilkerson, the Court was only 
concerned with whether there were uses of the firing squad outside of the 
Utah Territory.  Never did the Court consider the military‘s use of the firing 
squad as representative of a larger consensus on the issue.  Further, the mili-
tary at that time did not have a fully functioning criminal code separate 
from civil authority in times of war and peace.21  The opinion simply has no 
value as precedent to support the notion that the 2006 UCMJ amendment is 
indicative of an emerging national consensus concerning the constitutionali-
ty of a punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 
The second opinion cited was the more recent decision in Furman v. 
Georgia.22  Notably, Louisiana did not cite the majority opinion, but rather 
Justice Brennan‘s concurring opinion.  Even Justice Brennan‘s concurrence 
does not do the work that Louisiana would hope.  The reference in Furman 
was a citation to Wilkerson concerning the use of shooting as a method of 
execution.23  The passing reference was only a citation to Wilkerson as 
precedent and did not amount to a consideration of military law at the time.  
Thus, again, existing military law simply did not factor into any analysis of 





  See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 10. 
20
  99 U.S. 130 (1879) (link). 
21
  At that time, the military justice system was operated under the Articles of War.  Consequently, 
there was no peacetime military justice system until the UCMJ went into effect in 1951.  See Brigadier 
General (Ret.) John S. Cooke, Military Justice and the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2000 ARMY 
LAW. 1, 1–2 (2000). 
22
  See Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 10 (citing Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)). 
23
  Furman, 408 U.S. at 275 (Brennan, J., concurring) (link). 
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In contrast to the claims made by Louisiana, a more substantial review 
of the Court‘s Eighth Amendment opinions demonstrates that the UCMJ 
has not been used to support even one majority holding.  The United States 
Supreme Court has issued twenty-seven opinions—including Kennedy—
that have utilized the evolving standards of decency approach in analyzing 
claims under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth 
Amendment.24  While several Court opinions mentioned the military or the 
UCMJ, not one opinion considered the military‘s criminal code as part of 
the objective indicia in determining the national consensus. 
Significantly, the Court‘s decision in Coker v. Georgia,25 concerning 
the constitutionality of capital punishment for the crime of rape, made no 
mention of the existing UCMJ provision allowing for the death penalty in 
such cases.26  That Coker omitted the UCMJ is especially notable because, 
like Kennedy, Coker concerned the use of the death penalty for rape.  Fur-
ther, the methodology of Coker was used as the basis for the majority opi-
nion in Kennedy.  Thus, it should be no surprise that Kennedy, like Coker, 
ignored military law.  Also, the UCMJ provision that was seemingly con-
trary to the outcome in Coker remained in place even after the Court‘s deci-
sion in Coker.27  The Court‘s indifference as to the military in the Coker 
opinion highlights the uniqueness of the military within the criminal justice 
system.  Even after the Supreme Court struck down statutes authorizing 
capital punishment for rape, neither the military nor Congress felt the need 
to amend the UCMJ in response to the Coker decision.28 
In contrast to the Solicitor General‘s contention that the UCMJ 





  See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S. Ct. 2641 (2008); Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520 (2008); Roper 
v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 
504 (1995); Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992); Stanford 
v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 
487 U.S. 815 (1988); Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987); 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782 (1982); Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981); Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 
(1980); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977); Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Furman, 408 U.S. 238; McGautha v. Cali-
fornia, 402 U.S. 183 (1971); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 
(1958). This list omits opinions where only the dissent discussed the evolving standards of decency and 
instances were a writ of certiorari was denied. 
25
  433 U.S. 584 (link). 
26
  See id. 
27
  10 U.S.C. § 920(a) (2006) (those convicted of rape ―shall be punished by death or such other pu-
nishment as a court-martial may direct‖). 
28
  See id.  Nor, in fact, do the 2006 amendments to the UCMJ remove the death penalty as an option 
for rape of an adult.  National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, PUB. L. NO. 109-163, § 
552, 119 STAT. 3136, 63 (2006) (stating that, ―until the President otherwise provides,‖ the maximum pu-
nishments for rape—of an adult or a child—is ―death or such other punishment as a court-martial may 
direct‖). 
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not opposing—capital punishment in cases of child rape,‖29 there simply is 
no reason, based upon prior Court practice, to conclude that omission of 
military law is anything but normal practice for the Court.  To call into the 
question the legitimacy of the Kennedy opinion based upon the omission of 
the UCMJ amendment would warrant the Court revisiting all of its prior 
precedents under the evolving standards of decency approach to determine 
if there was similar military law in place at the time.  There is no precedent 
for including military law in evaluating the national consensus as to the 
evolving standards.  Perhaps this lack of precedent stems from the recogni-
tion by the Court of the unique role the military plays in American law and 
society. 
III. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF THE MILITARY 
The military has always had a unique place in American domestic law.  
It was that special role that led Colonel Sullivan to write that ―military jus-
tice remains the Rodney Dangerfield of legal systems.‖30  Part of the mili-
tary‘s special role is that those subject to military law enjoy differing levels 
of constitutional protection than do nonmilitary persons.  Members of the 
military have greater limitations on their constitutional rights under the 
First,31  Fourth,32 Fifth,33 Sixth,34 and Seventh35 Amendments.  While the Su-





  Solicitor General‘s Brief, supra note 10, at 5. 
30
  Sullivan, supra note 3. 
31
  See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507–10 (1986) (holding that review of military regu-
lations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of 
similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society) (link); United States v. Gray, 42 C.M.R. 255 
(C.M.A. 1970) (holding that declaration of personal belief can amount to disloyal statement if it dis-
avows allegiance owed to the United States by the declarant). 
32
  See United States v. Middleton, 10 M.J. 123, 126–27 (C.M.A. 1981) (holding that although the 
Fourth Amendment applies to military searches and seizures, it also takes into account the exigencies of 
military necessity and unique conditions that may exist within military society); United States v. Lewis, 
11 M.J. 188, 191 (C.M.A. 1981) (holding that expectations of privacy in the military are considerably 
different from what might be expected in civilian community). 
33
  The Fifth Amendment expressly limits its applicability in military settings.  U.S. CONST. amend. 
V (―No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a present-
ment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War of public danger . . . .‖) (emphasis added).  See also Kahn v. An-
derson, 255 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1921) (holding that the guaranty of presentment or indictment by a grand jury 
is not violated by providing for trials by courts-martial of persons subject to military law). 
34
  See Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43–48 (1976) (concluding that servicemen do not have 
the right to counsel in summary courts-martial proceedings) (link); United States v. Culp, 33 C.M.R. 
411, 419 (C.M.A. 1963) (―The Supreme Court has held, consistently, that one whose status subjects him 
to trial by court-martial is not entitled to trial by jury.‖). 
35
  See generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 816–821 (describing the nature and composition of courts-martial).  
The first Congress reenacted the Articles of War previously enacted by the Continental Congress on 
September 20, 1776, which provided no jury in courts-martial.  After the adoption of the Bill of Rights, 
on April 10, 1806, Congress enacted ―rules and articles by which the armies of the United States shall be 
governed,‖ and included no provision for a trial by jury.  Culp, 33 C.M.R. 411, 418–19 (C.M.A. 1963).  
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tary defendants under the Eighth Amendment, such a lessened protection 
follows from the prior treatment of persons under military justice in regard 
to every other relevant constitutional amendment.36  
If Congress‘s decisions concerning military criminal justice actually 
indicated a national consensus about such policies, we would be living in a 
truly bizarre world.  America has always treated the military as marching to 
the beat of its own drummer.  Policies that would never be supported for ci-
vilians have been enacted specifically for the military.  Outside of the mili-
tary, gays are allowed to declare their sexual orientation without penalty; 
women are not legally barred from a substantial portion of jobs; and adul-
tery is not a crime punishable by substantial prison time.37  Yet, under mili-
tary law, each of those situations is explicitly codified. 
Among the many differences between military and civilian law are the 
laws of rape—the very laws at issue in Kennedy.  As Major Jennifer Kneis 
noted, the current UCMJ definition of rape is ―virtually identical to the 
common law definitions used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.‖38  
Against the modern trend in rape law, the military still imposes a showing 
of resistance by the victim in rape cases as part of the ―force‖ requirement.39  





  Of the Bill of Rights, the Eighth Amendment is the only remaining amendment for which limita-
tion would even be remotely cognizable.  The Second Amendment‘s right to bear arms surely cannot be 
limited for military personnel whose jobs necessarily require the use of such weapons.  The Third 
Amendment actually limits military conduct to protect nonmilitary persons.  The Ninth Amendment has 
been so limited in scope that there is little room for someone in the military to have a lesser right. See 
Laurence Claus, Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, Disparagement, and the Ninth Amend-
ment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585, 631 (2004) (―The Ninth Amendment [does not provide individual 
rights; it] just recognizes that reconciling rights has a larger role to play in constitutional adjudication.‖).  
And the Tenth Amendment guarantees rights to the states and has no applicability to individuals in so-
ciety or the military. 
37
  The analogy to adultery statutes is especially notable.  If there was a civilian Eighth Amendment 
challenge to a criminal adultery conviction, it would make little sense to consider the military‘s policy in 
such a hypothetical case.  However, as CAAFlog commenter John O‘Connor noted, it is not as easily 
comparable to civilian law because ―the adultery criminalized by the UCMJ most assuredly is [a military 
offense], as an element of the offense is that the adultery had a negative effect on good order . . . .‖  
Posting of John O‘Connor to CAAFlog, 
https://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=34853720&postID=1796883615599221311&pli=1 (Sept. 
16, 2008, 12:08 EST) (link).  Nonetheless, the national consensus approach regularly ignores such statu-
tory differences in statutes.  In Kennedy, the Louisiana statute was different than that of the other five 
statutes because it was the only one that did not require a conviction for a prior sex offense.  See Posting 
of Corey Rayburn Yung to Sex Crimes Blog, http://sexcrimes.typepad.com/sex_crimes/2008/04/one-of-
these-st.html (Apr. 16, 2008, 11:06 AM) (link).  Yet, the Court treated the six statutes as essentially the 
same for measuring the national consensus.  Thus, the hypothetical adultery case is a viable example of 
where it would be preferable for the Court to ignore military law in measuring national consensus. 
38
  Maj. Jennifer S. Knies, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Why the New UCMJ’s Rape Law 
Missed the Mark, and How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put It Back on Target, ARMY LAW., 
Aug. 2007, at 1, 14, available at 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6052/is_2007_August/ai_n21108188 (link). 
39
  Id. at 15. 
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ual violence has no relation to the modern societal consensus about defining 
―rape.‖ 
When Congress enacts a law to modify the UCMJ, it only reflects a na-
tional consensus of the legitimacy of such a modification in the military—
not to society at large.  Some may have misgivings about this special status 
for the military.40  However, a rehearing in Kennedy should not be the ve-
hicle to test whether this special status makes constitutional sense—if only 
because the defendant in Kennedy has no connection at all to the military.  
Further, at the time the Kennedy opinion was issued, the unique status of the 
military rendered any potential consideration of the UCMJ amendment a 
non sequitur. 
THE COURT SHOULD NOT REVISIT ITS DECISION 
As Louisiana noted in its petition, the Supreme Court ―almost never 
grants petitions for rehearing.‖41  Given (i) that the Court has never consi-
dered military law in its evolving standards of decency cases and (ii) the 
special place the military occupies under American law and in American 
society, the omission of the UCMJ from the Kennedy decision is not at all 
noteworthy.  Rather, for the Court to have considered the UCMJ amend-
ment would mark a sharp deviation from prior Court practice and would ig-
nore the way that Congress has treated military law throughout American 
history.  If Louisiana wishes to argue that the Court‘s opinion was so fun-
damentally misguided that only a rehearing could cure that injustice, it is 
free to do so.  And if commentators believe that the evolving standards of 
decency methodology is fundamentally flawed, then they are still able to 
make such a criticism of the Kennedy opinion.  However, using the omis-
sion of the UCMJ amendment as a Trojan horse to repeat the same argu-
ments rejected in the original opinion is simply unsupportable as a matter of 





  Lawrence Tribe, for example, recently argued that the Court should reconsider its decision in 
Kennedy because of the inconsistencies inherent in ―treating the military as a parallel universe that simp-
ly does not intersect civilian justice on the plane of constitutional principle.‖  Tribe, supra note 7. 
41
  Petition for Rehearing, supra note 9, at 1. 
